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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT

All living things create waste gases. The waste from plants is oxygen which ani-

mals breathe, and the waste from animals is carbon dioxide which plants
"breathe." Every day the industrialized world pumps great quantities of contaminants into the air. Cars, factories, homes, and offices all create waste gases. Unfortunately, there is not a symmetrical user of the latter waste gases. They stay in

the environment.
Scientists have discovered an alarming effect that some of these gases may be

having on the environment. Carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, mainly from fossil
fuel combustion and the destruction of rain forests; methane, mainly from natural
gas production, landfills, and farm animals, and chlorofluorocarbons, mainly
from aerosol propellants, refrigeration, and automotive air conditioners, are collecting in the atmosphere. Because these gases take up only a small percentage of
the air, they are known as "trace gases."1 The collection of trace gases is resulting
in the trapping of more and more of the sun's heat. If the world could stop producing all trace gases today, it would take at least a century for those now present to be
absorbed to preindustrial levels. 2 It will not, however, be easy to abandon the ac-

* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Mississippi. The author would like to express his appreciation
to Richard J. McLaughlin, of the Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program, for helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
1.Miller, Policy Responses to Global Warming, 14 S.ILL. U.L.J. 187, 195,200 (1990).
2. Id. at 193 (suggesting that stabilization would be impossible because of the long life of the trace gases).
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tivities responsible for emission of trace gases. Since trace gases are emitted from
several small sources -as opposed to some pollutants which are produced by a few
large sources-there is no single solution that will resolve the problem? Moreover, because society has become dependent on the products that produce trace
gases, it would take several decades before their production could be completely
phased out. 4 Unfortunately, carbon emissions are not currently declining; they are
growing at the rate of about three percent per year.' The likely result is a gradual
warming that could lead to worldwide climatic change.'
The effects of a general increase in temperatures on a global scale would be dramatic. They could include changes in cloud cover, increased vegetation growth,
increased biological decay, and a reduction of the polar ice pack.7 The "most pervasive and certain [impact of rising greenhouse temperatures, however,] is the
thermal expansion of the oceans and the melting glaciers . . ., [which is] likely to
raise sea levels by 0.5 to 2.0 meters by the year 2100. "8 Such a dramatic shift in

3. Id. at 204.
4. Id. at 197 (suggesting that it would take 20 to 50 years).
5. Id. at 195.
6. See generally S.ROAN, OZONE CRISIS: THE 15 YEAR EVOLUTION OF A SUDDEN GLOBAL EMERGENCY (1989);
S. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING: ARE WE ENTERING THE GREENHOUSE CENTURY? (1989). It must be noted
that not all scientific evidence supports the theory. At least one theory suggests that the effect will lead to more

cloud cover, reducing temperatures. Moreover, with any issue as political as the environment, political posturing
may sometimes distort a true picture. Consider the following statement by Stephen Schneider of the National
Center for Atmospheric Research and author of the book, GLOBAL WARMING: ARE WE ENTERING THE GREENHOUSE CENTURY?:

On the one hand, as scientists, we are ethically bound to the scientific method, in effect promising to tell

the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but- which means that we must include all the doubts, the caveats,
the ifs, ands, and buts. On the other hand, we are not just scientists, but human beings as well. And like
most people we'd like to see the world a better place, which in this context translates into our working to
reduce the risk of potentially disastrous climatic change. To do that we need to get some broad based support, to capture the public's imagination. That, of course, entails getting loads of media coverage. So we
have to offer up scary scenarios, make simplified, drmatic statements, and make little mention of any
doubts we might have. This "double ethical bind" we frequently find ourselves in cannot be solved by any
formula. Each of us has to decide what the right balance is between being effective and being honest. I

hope that means being both.
Schell, Our FragileEarth, DISCOVER, Oct. 1989, at 44, 47 (emphasis added). Schneider's remarks have led one
conservative commentator to charge that what is written and stated on global warming "is most always from environmental fanatics more interested in 'dramatic statements' than in being honest." Harvey, Confessions of an
Alarmist, The Oxford Eagle, Jan. 25, 1990, at 4, col. 2. Nonetheless, the weight of the evidence and expert opinion suggest that if present trends continue the earth will experience a general increase in temperatures. In fact,
the Earth may already have experienced a slight increase in temperatures because of greenhouse gases. The
1980's were the warmest decade in human history. Miller, supra note 1,at 194; see also Solomon & Freedberg,
The Greenhouse Effect: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 20 ENVTL. L. 83, 89 (1990) ("[Sjcientists have concluded
that global temperatures have increased from 0.5 to 0.7 degrees Celsius over the last century.").
7. Shabecoff, Global Warming:Experts PonderBewilderingFeedback Effects, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1989, at
C 1,col. 1.

8. Solomon & Freedberg, supra note 6, at 93; see Miller, supra note 1, at 190 ("[Mlodels currently predict a
rise of 0.5 to 1.5 meters during the next fifty to one hundred years."); Titus, Greenhouse Effect, Sea Level Rise,

and BarrierIslands: Case Study ofLong Beach Island, New Jersey, 18 COASTAL MGMT. 65, 65 (1990) ("the greenhouse effect is likely to raise sea level a few feet in the next 100 years"). The level of the increase, however, is
subject to dispute. Id. at 66.
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water levels would threaten major cities, destroy wetlands, 9 and completely reshape the world's coastal areas. Estuaries, coastal aquifers, and other water reserves will likely become more salty,1" and rivers will also suffer as salt
concentrations migrate upstream." This, in turn, will make these areas less attractive breeding grounds for aquatic life and less fit for many human purposes.
In Mississippi, as well as in most other states, a major change in coastal geography would have an important legal effect. Under the public trust doctrine, Mississippi coastal property that is subject to the ebb and flow of tidal influences is not
owned by the record property owners;12 it is held by the state as trustee for the
people of the state.13 As a result, a property owner whose land is encroached upon
by rising tides can lose title to that property. Moreover, there are severe restrictions on the state's ability to alienate trust property. Thus, a property owner could
lose title to the state, without receiving compensation, and the state might be prohibited from making a "sweetheart deal" to return the property to the record
owner.14 This paper explores the public trust doctrine and the impact of rising
tides in Mississippi and suggests strategies to help the state and coastal property
owners deal with climatic changes in the next century.
II.

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF RISING TIDAL WATER

The most likely (and most widely assessed) effects of a future sea level rise are
inundation, erosion, increased flooding, and saltwater intrusion.1 " Even a small
increase in sea water levels could have dramatic effects worldwide. A one meter
increase in water levels could destroy from twenty-five to eighty percent of the

9. The importance of wetlands has been recognized only in fairly recent times. In the mid-1800's, the federal government viewed wetlands mainly as a health menace and a hindrance to land development. See President's Council on Environmental Quality, Fifteenth Annual Report of the Council on EnvironmentalPolicy 274
(1984). That perception continued more or less unchanged until a 1956 publication entitled Wetlands of the
United States was issued to set forth the value of wetlands to wildlife. Id. at 275. Since 1956, a number of environmental studies have been published that document the ecological value of these unique land-water environments. Id.
Mississippi's Yazoo Basin contains numerous wetlands which serve as nurseries and breeding grounds for fish
and wildlife. These animals depend on the swampy ecosystems for food and shelter. These extremely valuable
natural resources are also among the prime wintering areas for migratory waterfowl in Mississippi. Loss of these
wetlands could seriously impact on wildlife populations.
10. Solomon & Freedberg, supra note 6, at 96.
11. Id. at98.
12. But see Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 29-15-1 to -23 (Supp. 1989) (1989 Public Trust Tidelands Legislation) and
infra notes 152-82 and accompanying text.
13. The public trust doctrine applies to coastal lands affected by the tide and to navigable fresh waters, like
rivers and lakes. However, the rules for fresh waters differ significantly from the rules for tidal water. The scope
of this paper is limited to the coastal shoreline, which is the area most likely to be affected by greenhouse-induced
climatic changes. For a general discussion of the public trust doctrine in Mississippi as it relates to navigable
fresh waters as well as coastal property, see Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986),
affd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988); Jarman, Of Time, Tidelands, and
Public Trust, 57 Miss. L.J. 131 (1987).
14. But see infm notes 152-82 and accompanying text.
15. Titus, supra note 8, at 66.
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world's coastal wetlands. 18 A two to seven foot rise could cost the United States
fifty to ninety percent of its wetlands. 17 Because of their geography, a simple one
foot rise in sea level in New Jersey and Maryland could erode the shore from fifty
to one hundred feet. 18 This, in turn, would expose more areas to possible flooding. 9 Moreover, the post-greenhouse environment may be more susceptible to violent storms and severe weather;2" thus, loss of a coastal buffer zone could
endanger many properties in or near that area.
The primary concern of coastal property owners is the loss of land and improvements due to flooding. Expensive beachfront homes and hotels may one day
be inundated, or at least partially flooded. As the water approaches these properties, the beachfront itself will also be lost.21
Others have written on the enormous potential liability of the federal government, which underwrites most flood insurance for coastal communities.22 It has
even been suggested that buildings might be constructed so that when the first
floor becomes flooded, it would be closed off and the remaining structure used by
entering on the second floor.23 However, property owners in many states face a
legal problem that will prevent them from undertaking such a plan. When their
property becomes subject to tidal influences, they will lose title to it. Title will
revert to the state, as trustee for the people of the state, under the public trust doctrine.
Dating back at least to the sixth century and ancient Roman law, the public trust
doctrine is well entrenched in the English common law.24 The underlying rationale is that certain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen that their
free availability is necessary if a society is ever to develop and prosper." Because
of the importance of navigation and fishing, navigable and coastal waters have
long been recognized as corridors for water-borne commerce and as areas where
the public is free to fish.2" Private ownership of these waters would therefore con-

16. Solomon & Freedberg, supra note 6, at 96. The land at risk throughout the world is estimated to be approximately five million square kilometers, roughly three percent of the total land surface of the globe. Ocean
Science News, Nov. 15, 1989, at 2 (reporting on a presentation made by David D. Caron, acting Professor of Law
at the University of California, Berkley).
17. Titus, supra note 8, at 66; Miller, supra note 1, at 190.
18. Titus, supra note 8, at 66.
19. Id. at 66-67.
20. Id. at 67-68.
21. Some states are taking steps to assure that the beaches will not be lost by requiring removal of any building
seaward of the vegetation line and by requiring new construction to be set far enough back from the waterline to
offset any foreseeable water level increase. Id. at 70-71.
22. See, e.g., Solomon & Freedberg, supra note 6, at 105.
23. Titus, supra note 8, at 85.
24. For a thorough account of the ancient history of the public trust doctrine, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471,475-78 (1970). See also J.
KALO, COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 73 (1990) (tracing the history back to ancient Romans and noting renewed interest in the doctrine following the signing of the Magna Carta).
25. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,414 (1842).
26. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891) ("It is, indeed, the susceptibility to use as highways of commerce which gives sanction to the public right of control over navigation upon [navigable waters] ....
"); see
infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
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flict with the needs of society.27 American courts have held it "inconceivable" that
any person should claim a private property interest in the navigable waters of the
United States. 28 Thus, the people have the right to use these waterways, despite
claims of private ownership. 29 The state holds this property in trust for the benefit
of the people. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has declared, "fee simple title to
all lands naturally subject to tidal influence, inland to today's mean high water
mark, is held by the State of Mississippi in trust [for the public good].""
The Mississippi trust has its origins in the formation of this nation. After the
American Revolution, the thirteen colonies stood as independent sovereigns, each
with the same sovereign prerogatives that England possessed during its control of
the colonies. 31 When the colonies agreed to unite, they did not convey their
shores; therefore, they were deemed to have retained the same boundaries that
they had when they were independent sovereigns.32 This meant that the new states
owned these tidelands and exercised authority over the waters and submerged
lands beyond the tidelands." These34properties were reserved by the states to be
"held in trust for the public benefit.
Prior to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the Continental Congress
adopted the Northwest Ordinance, which, inter alia, established guidelines for the

27. See Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish:A FurtherExploration of the Denunciation Theory ofPunishment, 65 TUL. L. REv. 299 (1990) (discussing the needs of society and the reasons for its formation).
28. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913).
29. Therefore, private owners cannot exclude the public from using this water. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454-64 (1892); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891); Newcomb v. City of
Newport Beach, 7 Cal. 2d 393,400-08, 60 P.2d 825, 828-32 (1936); City of Oakland v. E.K. Wood Lumber
Co., 211 Cal. 16, 22-29,292 P. 1076, 1079-81 (1930); Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 189-94, 273 P. 797,
815-17 (1928), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 517 (1929); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603,612-16, 47 So.
353, 356-58 (1908).
30. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508,510-11 (Miss. 1986).
31. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 (1894); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410
(1842).
32. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 30 (1947); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845);
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410.
33. See, e.g., Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (upholding Massachusetts' right to regulate
fishing in a bay area); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 220 (confirming a grant by Alabama of submerged
lands in Mobile Bay); Moore, Expropriationof the Texas 'Tidelands"by JudicialFiat, 3 BAYLOR L. REv. 130, 135
(1951) (Texas leasing 350,000 acres of submerged lands offshore).
34. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State 491 So. 2d at 512 (citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821)); see
also Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410 (after the American Revolution, the people of each
state took title to navigable waters).
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admission of new states into the Union.3" Specifically, the Northwest Ordinance
provided that any state joining the Union would be admitted "on an equal footing
with the original States."3 6 The drafters of the Northwest Ordinance clearly intended this to include access to waterways. They wrote: "The navigable waters
leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the
same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of
the said territory, as to the citizens of the United States . .. without any tax, impost, or duty therefor."37 Later, as new states were admitted to the Union, they
were given an "equal footing" with the original thirteen.3 8 Thus, like the original
thirteen colonies, each new state kept its tidelands and navigable waters in public
39

trust.

Because of the fluctuating nature of tidelands, the exact location of the boundaries of the new states was subject to dispute. In 1947 the United States Supreme

35. After the Revolutionary War the wilderness property north of the Ohio River and west of Pennsylvania
presented a problem. Seven colonies had land claims in that area. The other six refused to join the confederation
until those claims were ceded to the Union under the Articles of Confederation. In 1780, New York gave its western lands to the central government, and other states followed suit. All lands ceded to the Union were "formed
into distinct Republican states" with the same "rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence" as the original
thirteen. The three Northwest Ordinances represented efforts at organizing these new lands.
The first ordinance, passed by Congress in 1784, divided the region into sixteen districts that were to be
granted statehood when their populations reached 20,000. In 1785 Congress enacted a second ordinance "for
ascertaining the mode of disposing of lands in the western territory." It provided for surveying the region into
townships of 36 square miles, which would be subdivided into 36 one square mile sections. In each township a lot
was reserved for public schools, and land was set aside for bounty payments to war veterans.
The third and most important ordinance was enacted in 1787, superseding the earlier Acts. For each district
within the area, Congress would appoint a governor, a secretary and three judges, who would govern until the
area's population reached 5000 free adult males. At that time a district legislature could be established. When
the population of any of the districts reached 60,000, the district could be admitted as one of the projected three
to five states to be carved out of the Northwest Territory. The ordinance also guaranteed religious freedom and
fundamental civil rights and prohibited slavery within the territory. READER'S DIGEST, FAMILY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 809-10 (1975); see Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory, New York
City, July 13, 1787, 4 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, pp. 752-54, reprinted in I Stat. 51 (1853)
[hereinafter JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS].
To the extent that it applies to the internal affairs of newly admitted states, the Northwest Ordinance has been
superseded by the United States Constitution and the constitutions of the several states. See Economy Light &
Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 119 (1921); see also Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Ordinance of 1787Navigable Waters- CarryingPlacesBetween the Same, 1939 Wis. L. REv. 547, 550 (Except for the public trust,
"the Ordinance has become obsolete."). Id. at 550. However, the "equal footing" doctrine, which derived from
the Northwest Ordinance, still directly impacts on state lands.
36. JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 35, at 52.
37. Id. Thomas Jefferson was the principal author of the first two Northwest Ordinances. FAMILY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 35, at 809.
38. See generally Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S.
1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391 (1903);
Mobile Transp. Co. v. Mobile, 187 U.S. 479 (1903); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I(1894); Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Knight v. United Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161 (1891); Hardin v. Jordan, 140
U.S. 371 (1891); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); San Francisco City & County v. Le Roy,
138 U.S. 656 (1891); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1877); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
39. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,476 (1988) ("[W]e reaffirm our long-standing precedents which hold that the States, upon entry into the Union, received ownership of all lands under waters subject
to the ebb and flow of the tide."); see also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551 (1981); Pollard v. Hagan,
44 U.S. (3 How.) at 228-29 (describing a 1787 ordinance which set forth the equal footing doctrine); Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. at 26 (setting forth the equal footing doctrine).
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Court held that California did not own offshore submerged lands,4" and in 1950
the Court denied Texas and Louisiana any such ownership in the Gulf of Mexico.41
These cases settled state boundaries at the low-water mark of the seas. In 1953,
however, Congress, acting pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act,42 quitclaimed to
the states the beds of the marginal seas. The effect of this Act was to add submerged lands to the already existing state ownership of the tidelands. The United
States Supreme Court has since held that the normally applicable rule puts the inland boundary line to the trust property at the line of mean high tide.43
At the time of Mississippi's statehood, the United States conveyed a public trust
to Mississippi to be held for public purposes.44 In this trust was the fee simple title
to the tidelands and navigable waters of the state, and the beds and lands underneath those waters. 45 As the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained:
Upon the admission of the state into the Union, there became invested in the state, as
trustee, the title to all the land under tidewater, including the spaces between ordinary high and low water marks; this title of the state being held for public purposes,
chief among which purposes is that of commerce and navigation ..

..

Once this public trust was created and funded, title to the land became vested in

40. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38 (1947).
41. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 715-20 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705-06
(1950).
42. Act of May 22, 1953, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29-33, (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982 and
Supp. 1990)); see also United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 145-49 (1965) (discussing the history of such
legislation).
43. Roberts, The Luttes Case-Locating the Boundary of the Seashore, 12 BAYLOR L. REv. 141, 153-54
(1960); Winters, The Shorelinefor Spanish andMexican Grants in Texas, 38 TEx. L. REv. 523, 526-30 (1960);
see also Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-13 (1971) (confirming state ownership of beds to high-water
mark); Petersen v. United States, 327 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1964); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 320 F.2d
205, 207 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 943 (1964). Mississippi Law is in accord. Cinque Bambini
Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d at 520 (Miss. 1986) (citing O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 235
A.2d 1,9-12 (1967)).
The mean high water mark "is the arithmetic mean of all the high waters occurring in a particular nineteenyear tidal epoch period." Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-1 (Supp. 1989); see also Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935) (average of all high tides over an 18.6 year cycle, as determined by the
United States, Coast and Geodetic Survey). Thus, areas which are occasionally subject to flooding are not
thereby made part of the trust. When dealing with non-tidal waters, the "mean high water mark" is used to determine the boundary. J. KALo, supra note 24, at 88; see also supra note 13.
44. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 511 (Miss. 1986). Those public purposes "include
navigation and transportation, commerce, bathing, swimming and other recreational activities, development of
mineral resources, environmental protection and preservation, the enhancement of aquatic, avian and marine
life, sea agriculture and .. .other [purposes]." Id. at 512 (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 512-17. By contrast, although navigable fresh water is held in public trust, the land underneath
navigable freshwater rivers, lakes and streams can be privately owned. See Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 498
(Miss. 1990).
46. Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss. 704,713, 146 So. 291,291-92 (1933); see also State ex rel. Rice v.
Steward, 184 Miss. 202, 230-31, 184 So. 44, 50 (1938) ("[Wle hold the State of Mississippi to be the absolute
owner of the title of the soil, and of the minerals contained therein . . . wherever the tide ebbs and flows, as
trustee for the people of the State."); id. at 230, 184 So. at 50 ("[T]he state owns the title to the land beneath
tidewaters, [as trustee for the people,] subject only to the [paramount] right of the United States to control commerce and navigation . .

").
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the state, subject to the trust.47 At that point, federal control of the trust property
8
came to an end and state law became the basis for management of the trust.4
Thus, "it has been long established that the individual States have the authority to
define the limits of the lands held in public trust . ..,
Trust lands were to be held in the public trust for various purposes. "The original purpose of the doctrine was to preserve for the use of all the public natural water resources for navigation and commerce, waterways being the principal
transportation arteries of early days, and for fishing, an important source of
food."" The purposes, however, are not fixed. Courts have long recognized that
the list of uses would increase with "the growth of the community and its progress
in the arts.""'
[T]he public trust doctrine has developed almost exclusively as a matter of state law.
Traditionally, the doctrine has functioned as a constraint on states' ability to alienate
public trust lands and as a limitation on uses that interfere with trust purposes. More
recently, courts and commentators have found in the doctrine a dynamic commonlaw principle flexible enough to meet diverse modern needs. The doctrine has been
expanded to protect additional water-related uses such as swimming and similar recreation, aesthetic enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and preservation of flora and fauna
indigenous to public trust lands.52

Over the years, Mississippi courts have recognized public trust purposes as including: fishing; 3 navigation and transportation;5 4 commerce; 5 bathing, swim57
6
ming and other recreational activities; development of mineral resources;
environmental protection and preservation;5 8 the enhancement of aquatic, avian

47. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 379-80 (1977); Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,435-36 (1892); Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508,
512 (Miss. 1986).
48. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d at 513; Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand
& Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 371.
49. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,475 (1988).
50. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 304, 294 A.2d 47, 52 (1972).
These three purposes have been called "the traditional triad" of public trust rights. J. KALO, supra note 24, at
119.
5 I. Inhabitants of W. Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 167 (1863) (noting the rights of navigation, bathing, washing, watering cattle, and other agricultural uses); see also Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181,
199-200, 53 N.W 1139, 1143 (1893) (Public uses of trust waters are used "by the people . . . for . . . purposes
which cannot be enumerated or anticipated.").
52. District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi 484 U.S. 469, 487-88 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that navigation and transportation are the matters of importance).
53. State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 Miss. 202, 231, 184 So. 44, 50 (1938).
54. Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss. 704,713, 146 So. 291,292 (1933); Martin v. O'Brien, 34 Miss. 21
(1857).
55. Rouse v. Saucier's Heirs, 166 Miss. at 713, 146 So. at 292.
56. Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 632-33 (Miss. 1967) (recreational activities recognized as included within public trust rights). See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-27-1 to -69 (1990); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 15-1-4 (Supp. 1988) ("public waterways" defined and the right of free transport, fishing and water sports
reserved to the public).
57. Treuting, 199 So. 2d at 633; Cinque Bambini Partnership,491 So. 2d at 512.
58. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-27-3 and -5(a) (Supp. 1985); see also infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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and marine life, sea agriculture and other purposes. 59 These purposes are imporright, but also because they restrict
tant not only because they define the public's
60
the state's ability to alienate these interests.
Even though waters are part of the public trust and the public has a right to pass
along the foreshore, 61 there is not necessarily a right to cross private land to reach
those waters.62 The public can obtain aprescriptiveeasement, entitling it to access
to the water if there has been continuous use, adverse to the owner (not by permission), but with the owner's knowledge, and for a prescribed period of time.63 In
Mississippi, that period would be ten years. 64 The public may also obtain such a
right under the theory of dedication if the owner has shown an express or implied
intent to allow public use.65 Under this theory, no requisite time period need be
shown.66 Finally, the old English common law doctrine of custom may allow access to water.67 Obviously then, even though the trust does not necessarily carry
with it the right to access, courts are willing to find such a right when there is a
reasonable argument set forth on the public's behalf.68
III.

RISING WATER LEVELS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST BOUNDARY

Perhaps the biggest difference between water property boundaries and boundaries on dry land is that water boundaries are tentative. A riparian or littoral owner

59. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 498 (Miss. 1990) (containing an essay on the joys of fishing); Cinque
Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 512 (Miss. 1986).
60. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
61. R. CLARK, I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36.4(A), at 201 (1967).
62. See Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254,259-60, 90 P. 532, 534 (1907); State v. Black Bros., 116
Tex. 615, 626-30, 297 S.W. 213, 217-19 (1927); Lundberg v. University of Notre Dame, 231 Wis. 187, 199202, 282 N.W. 70, 76-77 (1938) (containing further discussion of this issue). Cf Matthews v. Bayhead ImprovementAss'n, 95 N.J. 306, 323-24, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (recognizing the public's right to use dry sand beaches),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
63. See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Gulf, M.
& 0. R.R. Co. v. Tallahatchie Drainage Dist., 218 Miss. 583,593-95,67 So. 2d 528, 532-33 (1953) (easements
may be obtained through express grant, implied grant, or prescription); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375
S. W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). By contrast, private entities cannot normally obtain rights in the public trust
property through the doctrine of adverse possession. See, e.g., State ex rel. Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v.
State Mineral Bd., 199 So. 2d 554, 557 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Rohrer v. Credle, 322 N.C. 522, 534-35, 369
S.E.2d 825, 831 (1988); O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307, 320,235 A.2d 1,8 (1967) (exclusive right
to take oysters from lands under navigable waters cannot be acquired by prescriptive use). But see Board of Trustees v. Rye, 521 So. 2d 900, 908 (Miss. 1988) (upholding the transfer of school trust property to an individual and
indicating that even if the transfer were invalid, 93 years of use and payment of taxes would suffice to transfer
title).
64. See Lindsey v. Shaw, 210 Miss. 333, 337, 49 So. 2d 580, 583 (Miss. 1950) (ten year period required to
acquire an easement); Rychlak, Common Law Remedies for EnvironmentalWrongs: The Role ofPrivateNuisance,
59 Miss. L.J. 657, 694 n.231 (1989) (discussing requisite time periods in Mississippi).
65. See Coleman v. Shipp, 223 Miss. 516, 530-31, 78 So. 2d 778, 784 (1955); Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); see also Gion v. Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 38-41, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162, 167-69,465 P.2d 50, 55-57 (1970). After the Gion decision was handed down, concerned property owners
put up fences, dynamited paths, and planted cactus plants to dissuade the public and to avoid any claim of dedication. J. KALO, supra note 24, at 139 (citing Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last -At Least They Lose Their Property:
Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 75, 84 (1971)).
66. J. KALO, supra note 24, at 137.
67. See State ex. rel. Thorton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595-99, 462 P.2d 671, 676-78 (1969).
68. This, of course, is reasonable, since the trust is of little value if no one can reach the trust property. For a
general discussion of these theories, see J. KALo, supra note 24, at 134-35.
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may be able to ascertain exact boundaries today, but through accretion, reliction,
or erosion, those boundaries can change in the future without benefit of deed, conveyance, or any public record of the change. 69 The common law approach is that
accretions to the shores of the sea belong to the riparian or littoral owner of the
land bordering the sea.7" By the same token, private landowners may lose title to
lands via reliction. 7' Land which was once covered by navigable water, hence subject to reasonable use by the public, may revert to private ownership if the navigable water has shifted away from the land. 72
One issue which will emerge in the next century is whether the state takes control of property that had been in private hands but which has become subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide due to higher water levels caused by the greenhouse effect.
This matter is governed by state law.7" The original boundary of the trust property
could probably still be determined. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated
that the Gulf s high tide mark "in theory, at least - [is] ascertainable as of 1817 ..
• .Fee simple title to all areas south of it was granted to the State in trust. ' 74 However, because water boundaries shift, the 1817 boundaries are not the ones of
import for determining what lands are held in trust by the state today.
If over decades, epochs or even centuries the tides rise -that is, the mean high water
mark rises (and there is reason to believe this has happened and may continue to
happen) -the inward reach of the tidal influence expands. More lands are tidally
affected . . . .Sufficient unto this day is our holding that, where the forces of nature - gradually and imperceptibly - have operated to expand or enlarge the inland
reach of the ebb and flow of the tide, the new tidelands so affected accrete to the
trust. Put otherwise, state law decrees that the surveyable outer boundary of the
trust ...is today's mean high water line, regardless of the absence of a tidal influ-

69. But see Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 29-15-1 to -23 (Supp. 1989); Ocean Science News, Nov. 15, 1989, at 2-3
(suggesting that fixed boundaries for national boundaries would be advantageous).
70. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F2d 191, 194-97 (5th Cir. 195 1), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 920 (1952); Jackson v. United States, 56 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1932); Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 219, 233
N.W.159, 165-66 (1930) (noting that this is a "general, possible universal" rule). Mississippi law is in accord
and holds that the owner of land bounded by water is entitled to accretions thereto. See Paepcke v. Kirkman, 55
F.2d 814, 815 (5th Cir. 1932); Anderson-Tully Co. v. Franklin, 307 F. Supp. 539, 542 (N.D. Miss. 1969);
Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State 491 So. 2d 508, 519 (Miss. 1986); H.K. Porter Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 324 So. 2d 746, 751 (Miss. 1975). The common law was not adopted by the State of Louisiana. Under the
Civil Code of Louisiana, lands bordering the sea take nothing by accretion or dereliction. S. WILKINSON, AcCRETION AND LAND TITLES UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW, reprinted in OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TIDELANDS AND ON LAND 158 (R. Slovenko ed. 1963).
71. See Anderson-Tully Co. v. Tingle, 166 F.2d 224, 227-29 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816
(1948); Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 519 (Miss. 1986).
72. See Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 501 (Miss. 1990); see also supra note 63 (private entities cannot
obtain rights in public trust property through the doctrine of adverse possession).
73. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381-82 (1977); see also
Cinque Bambini Partnership, 491 So. 2d at 519; cf Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 291 (1967) (federal
law controls ownership of land gradually deposited by the ocean on adjoining upland property conveyed by the
United States prior to statehood).
74. Cinque BambiniPartnership,491 So. 2d at 515. But see Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. at 7-8 (Ch. Ct.
of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990) (noting the difficulty of actually determining the 1817 boundary).
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ence in 1817, of how far inland and remote from the sea, and regardless of how shallow or how insignificant the tidal influence . . ..

Thus, under traditional public trust law, current property owners will lose title to
the state if their land becomes subject to tidal influence due to a gradual, imperceptible rise in water levels. 76
This accession of land to the state would not be a taking within the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, nor would compensation be required under the Mississippi Constitution.77 Moreover, the state would
be able to claim not only a right of way on the beach, but mineral rights would also
accrete to the state, including the right to oil and the right to grant oil exploration
leases.78 This is in keeping with the general rule which states:
All maritime nations, recognizing the vagaries of the sea, beyond human control
and anticipation, have evolved systems of law, founded upon rational perceptions of
common justice, to adjust and compensate its effects. The most ordinary effect of a
large body of water is to change the shore line by deposits or erosion gradually and
imperceptibly. In such cases it is the general, possibly universal rule . . . that the
title of the riparian owner follows the shoreline under what has been graphically
called "a movable freehold. 79

In short, if the addition to the shoreland, caused by accretion or reliction, or the
loss of shoreland caused by erosion is the result of slow, imperceptible, natural
forces, then the property line defining the trust follows.8"
A boundary which is changed by reason of avulsion, artificial construct, or
dredging does not alter title to lands or minerals.81 "[L]ands brought within the
ebb and flow of the tide by avulsion or by artificial or non-natural means are

75. Cinque Bambini Partnership, 491 So. 2d at 520 (footnotes omitted) (citing O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't,
50 N.J. 307, 322-24, 235 A.2d 1, 9-12 (1967)); see also Maloney & Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of
the Mean High Water Line in CoastalBoundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REv. 185, 195-222 (1974). But see infra
notes 162-77 and accompanying text (discussing Byrd, supra note 74).
76. But see Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-1 (Supp. 1989) and infra notes 152-82 and accompanying text.
77. Miss. CoNsT. art. III, § 17; see Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986)
(identifying other cases where such compensation would be required); see also infra note 97.
78. See generally Cinque Bambini Partnership, 491 So. 2d at 511 (involving the right to grant oil leases);
Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n, 199 So. 2d 627, 633 (Miss. 1967).
79. Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 219, 233 N.W. 159, 165-66 (1930) (quoting 28 HALSauPY LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (lst ed. 1914)).
80. But see Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 29-15-I to -23 (Supp. 1989) and infra notes 152-82 and accompanying text.
81. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986) ("[Bloundaries and titles are not
affected by avulsion .... We perceive no reason on principle for exclusion from this notion of a change ofwater
course boundary artificially induced by the dredging process."); Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d at 500. But see
International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So. 2d 395, 398-99 (Miss. 1972) ("[Plroperty
owners adjacent to tidelands were entitled to the accretionary buildup thereto whether it resulted from man-made
or natural accretion."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973), A New York state court ruled on this question, holding that avulsion will not defeat the public's right to the resulting shoreline between high and low water. "Although, where the shore recedes as the result of avulsion, the boundary of the littoral proprietor may not change,
the public has the same right of passage over the new foreshore as it had over the old-else an avulsion might cut
off the public right of passage altogether." People v. Steeplechase Park Co., 82 Misc. 247, 143 N.Y.S. 503, 509
(1913), affd, 165 A.D. 231, 151 N.Y.S. 157 (1914), modified, 218 N.Y. 459, 113 N.E. 521 (1916).
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owned by their private record titleholders."82 These lands do not enter the public
trust, but the public does have the right to use these waters.83 This, of course,
raises the question of whether a greenhouse-induced rise in the water level might
be considered an avulsion or an artificial construct.
An avulsion is the loss of lands bordering on the seashore by sudden or violent
action of the elements that is perceptible while in progress, such as a sudden and
rapid change in the course and channel of a boundary river.
The point . . . is illustrated by the Mississippi River's (in years past) not unfamiliar

avulsive cutoffs causing a change of channel. Land on the east side of the thalweg
one day may on the next day find itself on the west. Neither record title nor state
sovereignty is altered. Yet no one doubts the right of the public -the bargeline, the
commercial fisherman, the weekend pleasure boater or some latter day Huck Finn rest and
to use the waters of the new channel as fully as the old, though those waters
84
flow upon bottoms still owned by the pre-avulsion record title holder.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "[a]n avulsion is a change in a
boundary body of water so rapid or sudden, or in such short time, that the change
is directly perceptible or measurably visible at the time of its progress."" Despite
a projected comparatively fast rise in tidal waters over the next century and the
greenhouse effect being a "man-made" problem, such a tidal shift would not seem
to be the dramatic type of sudden movement or the intentionally-created change
that would lead to this exception to the general rule. The shift would almost certainly be imperceptible when it happened. As a result, new tidelands created by
the greenhouse effect would in all likelihood become part of the public trust.
Record title holders might argue that they should be entitled to keep the improvements that they placed on trust property before that property became part of
the trust. In Dycus v. Sillers, the Mississippi Supreme Court wrote that" 'physical
improvements or alterations thereto upon lands theretofore private under state law
remain private' the salt content of the waters notwithstanding."8 This language
creates a facial argument that land affected by a greenhouse tide would not become part of the public trust if there had been improvements made by the original
record holder. However, Justice Robertson, the author of Dycus v. Sillers, was
here referring to and quoting from the Cinque Bambini case, which he also authored. In Cinque Bambini Robertson wrote:
[U]nder the laws of this state neither artificially created water courses, inlets, slips,
marinas and the like, nor physical improvements or alterations made thereto, become a part of the public trust, even though they may become tidally affected ....

82. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 511 (Miss. 1986).
83. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 500, 503 (Miss. 1990).
84. Id. at 500.
85. Cinque BambiniPartnership,491 So. 2d at 520 (citing Sharp v. Learned, 195 Miss. 201,215, 14 So. 2d
218, 220 (1943)); see also Anderson-Tully Co. v. Franklin, 307 F. Supp. 539, 541-42 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
86. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d at 502 (quoting Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d at 520).
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[T]itle to such artificially created "tidelands"

...

remains in the record title-

holder."

Thus, despite the language in Dycus, it is not the improvements on the land that
give the record holders rights in the new coastal property, but rather the way the
new coast was created.
If the coast line shifts because of avulsion or a man-made construct, such as a
cove or harbor built near the existing shore, then that new shoreline remains with
the record title holder and does not revert to the trust. 88 However, when the shoreline is affected by a gradual imperceptible increase in water levels, the new tidal
property reverts to the trust, even though there may be improvements on the property. Again, a greenhouse-induced rise in seawater levels would seem to be that
type of gradual imperceptible increase which would cause the land to become part
of the public trust. Assuming that a greenhouse-induced tidal shift would happen
relatively slowly, the new tide would determine the boundaries of the trust.
IV.

COMPENSATION FOR RECORD TITLE HOLDERS?

If land formerly held in private ownership were, over the relatively short period
of a few decades, transferred to state ownership because of the greenhouse effect,
particularly where the property could still be of value to the private owner, one
might expect the state to accommodate the prior owner by refusing to assert authority over the property, by selling the property back to the owner, or by granting
the former owner a long-term lease at a favorable price. There will certainly be
political pressure for such a solution. In fact, the Mississippi Legislature has received such pressure and has responded with the 1989 Public Trust Tidelands
Legislation.89 These remedies, including the Mississippi legislation, are however,
at odds with the purposes of the public trust."
The state holds trust lands for the benefit of all the people. Three types of restrictions on governmental authority are generally said to be imposed by the public trust. First, the property subject to the trust must be used for a public purpose
and it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property

87. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520 (Miss. 1986).
88. In fact, the Cinque Bambini court faced a problem such as this. That case originally involved 140 acres of
land. The Mississippi Supreme Court, however, reversed a Chancery Court decision as to 98 of those acres and
held that they were not part of the trust because they were artificially-created tidelands caused by road construction. Id. at 520.
89. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 29-15-1 to -23 (Supp. 1989); see discussion infi at notes 152-82 and accompanying
text.
90. The Secretary of State has taken the position that the Mississippi legislation amounts to a donation in violation of section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison
County, Miss., April 18, 1990). Section 95 of the Mississippi Constitution states as follows:
Lands belonging to, or under the control of, the state shall never be donated directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals, or to railroad companies. Nor shall said land be sold to corporations or
associations for a less price than that for which it is subject to sale to individuals. This, however, shall not
prevent the legislature from granting a right of way, not exceeding one hundred feet in width, as a mere
easement, to railroads across state land, and the legislature shall never dispose ofthe land covered by such
right of way so long as such easement exists.
Miss. CONST. art IV, § 95.
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may not be sold, even for a fair market price; and third, the property must be
maintained for particular types of uses.91 As one Ohio court said:
If it is once fully realized that the state is merely the custodian of the legal title,
charged with the specific duty of protecting the trust estate and regulating its use, a
clearer view can be had. An individual may abandon his private property, but a public trustee cannot abandon public property.92
However, not all alienation of interests constitutes an abandonment. As the Supreme Court of Florida has explained:
The trust in which the title to the lands under navigable waters is held is governmental in its nature and cannot be wholly alienated by the States. For the purpose of enhancing the rights and interests of the whole people, the States may by appropriate
means, grantto individuals limitedprivileges in the lands under navigable waters, but

not so as to divert them or the waters thereon from their proper uses for the public
welfare . .

..

Clearly then, while complete private ownership of these lands is forbidden, individuals can hold certain rights in these properties."
Much public trust litigation centers around privately held trust land. Obviously
then, it is possible for the state to convey some interest. "Some interest" is the crucial language. 9" Most property owners on the coast own only a part of their property. The public at large still holds the right to use the waters and lands in keeping
with the trust purposes. Typically the private trust land owner's title is the subservient jus privatum title whereas the state retains a dominant jus publicum interest.9" Thejusprivatuminterest in trust lands can be held in private ownership, but

9 1. Sax, supra note 24, at 477; see, e.g., Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799 (Fla. 1957) (inability of state
to convey trust property if doing so would interfere with the public's enjoyment).
[The claim that trust property must be maintained for particular uses] is expressed in two ways. Either it
is urged that the resource must be held available for certain traditional uses, such as navigation, recreation, or fishery, or it is said that the uses which are made of the property must be in some sense related to
the natural uses peculiar to that resource. As an example of the latter view, San Francisco Bay might be
said to have a trust imposed upon it so that it may be used for only water-related commercial or amenity
uses. A dock or marina might be an appropriate use, but it would be inappropriate to fill the area for trash
disposal or for a housing project.
Sax, supra note 24, at 477.
92. State v. Cleveland & P.R. Co., 94 Ohio St. 61,80, 113 N.E. 677, 682 (1916).
93. Brickell v. Trammell, 77 Fla. 544, 559, 82 So. 221, 226 (1919) (emphasis added).
94. Sax, supra note 24, at 486.
95. A few courts have denied completely the power of the state to alienate trust property. See R. CLARK, supra
note 61, § 36.4(A), at 197 (citing People ex rel. Harbor Comm'rs v. Kerber, 152 Cal. 731, 93 P. 878 (1908)
(following CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 3)); Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438,457-59, 161 P. 854, 860
(1916) (railroad not permitted to take title to trust property); Milne v. Girodeau, 12 La. 324, 325-26 (1838)
(land below the high water mark cannot be privately owned); Hodges v. Williams, 95 N.C. 331, 339-40 (1886)
(land gradually covered by water from lake is sovereign); State ex rel. Cates v. West Tenn. Land Co., 127 Tenn.
575, 580-88, 158 S.W.746, 747-50 (1913).
96. The public's rights are dominant to the private owner's rights. As a result, any conflict between the exercise of public and private rights is resolved in favor of the public. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS AND IN THE SOIL AND SHORES THEREOF 33-34 (1926) ("The king, it is true, may grant the
soil of any arm of the sea, ...
but the right of the grantee so derived is always subservient to the public rights .
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the public's jus publicum interest cannot be privately owned.97 The private owner's use of trust lands may be restricted or prohibited in order to protect the public's
trust purposes, but this does not entitle the private owner to compensation."
The power of a state to grant an interest to private owners is usually upheld as
long as the interests of the public are safeguarded or promoted by the purposes of
the grant. The generally recognized rule is that any conveyance by the state is subject to the public trust, or subject to thejuspublicum, just as it was when the land
was held by the state. 9 Thus, when trust lands are conveyed into private ownership, thejus publicum is reserved for the public. 0 However, courts have permitted the transfer of some elements of the public trust into private ownership and
control even though that transfer may exclude or impair certain public uses.
Therefore, a private entity might be granted permission to drill for oil or dredge for
oysters even though that will interfere with fishing or swimming in those areas.
Since the state cannot convey thejus publicum, it might be thought that the state
should provide the jus privatum to the prior record owner who has lost his or her
property as the result of a general rise in water levels. However, a sale of trust
property, even at fair market prices, is not easy to accomplish. The first problem
is that the legislature must authorize the conveyance with clear and specific language.101 Moreover, a conveyance of trust land solely to further private interests
would contradict the public trust doctrine.102 No state has allowed trust property
to be alienated to private persons without regard to the utility and need of the property for the public, and without assurance that the property will be used to pro-

97. Although states clearly may convey ajusprivatum interest to private ownership, the public'sjus publicum
interest may under some circumstances be terminated, but it may not be conveyed into private hands. Illinois
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892); State v. Superior Ct. of Lake City., 29 Cal. 3d 210, 22627, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, 705-07, 625 P.2d 239 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); State ex rel. Land Bd.
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 283 Or. 147, 582 P.2d 1352 (1978); State Land Bd. v. Heuker, 25 Or. App. 137,
548 P.2d 1323 (1976); Corvallis & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Benson, 61 Or. 359, 121 P. 418,422 (1912); James River
& Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138 Va. 461,472-80, 122 S.E. 344, 351-52 (1924)
(bed of navigable stream could not be conveyed to private owner); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662,673-77,
732 P.2d 989, 994-97 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988).
98. People ex rel. Webb v. Califbrnia Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 599, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913) (en banc); Slater v.
Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 515, 49 N.E. 1017, 1019-20 (1898); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 674, 732
P.2d at 989, 997 (1987); State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454,467,338 N.W.2d 498 (1983).
99. R. CLARK, supra note 61, § 36.4(A), at 197.
100. People ex rel. Webb v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 598-99, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913) (en banc); Slater
v. Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 515, 49 N.E. 1017, 1019-20 (1898); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95
N.J. 306, 331-33, 471 A.2d 355, 369, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Corvallis & E. R.R. Co. v. Benson,
61 Or. 359, 369-74, 121 P. 418 (1912); Conneaut Lake Ice Co. v. Quigley, 225 Pa. 605,605, 610-11, 74 A. 648
(1909); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 668-75, 732 P.2d 989, 994-97 (1987).
101. Taylor v. Underhill, 40 Cal. 471,473 (1871) (may be done only if in the interest of commerce); Concord
Mfg. Co. v. Robertson, 66N.H. 1,5-9, 25 A. 718,720-21(1890); Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. 624,680-81 (1852)
(A legislature "has no power to divest [trust lands] . . . because this would ... sacrifice public rights for the
promotion of mere private interests."); see also R. CLARK, supra note 61, § 36.4(A), at 196. But see Byrd v.
State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990) (accepting legislature's claim of
public purpose); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-55 (1892); see also Long Sault Dev. Co.
v. Call, 242 U.S. 272,279-80 (1916); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662,666,732 P.2d 989,992-93 (1987).
See generally J. KALO, supra note 24, at 73.
102. Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. 624, 680-81 (1852) (A legislature "has no power to divest [trust lands] ...
because this would . . . sacrifice public rights for the promotion of mere private interests.").
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mote at least a quasi-public purpose.10 3 Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court has held that:
The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be discharged
by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, canAny grant of the kind is necnot be relinquished by a transfer of the property ....
essarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust by which the property was held by
the State can be resumed at any time. 10 4

Corrective legislation designed to appease record property owners would contradict this rule. Hence, any property rights which are transferred under such legislation would appear to be revocable.
The most celebrated public trust case in American law is the decision of the
0
United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois. o In
1869, the Illinois legislature made an extensive grant in fee simple of submerged
lands to the Illinois Central Railroad. That grant included all the land underlying
Lake Michigan for one mile out from the shoreline and extending one mile in
length along the central business district of Chicago -more than one thousand
acres of land.108 The conveyance provided that:
[T]he fee to said lands shall be held by said company in perpetuity, and . .. said
company shall not have power to grant, sell or convey the fee to the same . . .. And
provided, also, That nothing herein contained shall authorize obstructions to the
Chicago harbor, or impair the public right of navigation; nor shall this act be construed to exempt the . . . Railroad . . . from any act of the General Assembly
which may be hereafter passed regulating the rates of wharfage and dockage to be
charged in said harbor .... 107
The railroad was required, under the terms of the conveyance, to pay money to
both the city and the state. 108 Although the railroad was willing, and the first payment was tendered to Chicago, it was not accepted." 9 No payments were ever
made to the state. Not only did the legislature repeal the 1869 grant, the state
brought an action to have the original grant declared invalid. " The railroad
claimed that it had received absolute title to the submerged lands and was prohib-

103. R. CLARK, supra note 61, § 36.4(A), at 196. But see Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of

Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990) (accepting legislature's claim of public purpose).
104. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-55 (1892); see also Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Call,
242 U.S. 272,278-79 (1916); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 666, 732 P.2d 989, 992-93 (1987).
105. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
106. See J. KALO, supra note 24, at 73.
107. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 406 n. 1.
108. J. KALO, supra note 24, at 74.
109. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 408.
Id.
110.

at 410-11.
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ited only from transferring the technical fee title.111 The Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the circuit court, declaring the grant invalid." 2
The Court's approach to the conveyance of trust property has become central to
public trust litigation. When a state holds a resource which is available for the free
use of the general public, any governmental conduct which is calculated either to
reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the selfinterest of private parties will be viewed with considerable skepticism. 1 3 The unstated rationale is that the government operates in order to provide widely
available public services, such as schools, police protection, libraries, and parks.
While there may be valid reasons to benefit some group smaller than the whole
citizenry, there is usually some relatively obvious reason for the subsidy, such as a
need to assist the poor. However, when a program benefits a certain group and
there is no obvious social reason for singling out this group, suspicions should be
aroused. Thus, although the Court may not actually prohibit the disposition 14of
trust lands to private parties, grants of tidelands are to be "construed strictly."'
This judicial skepticism means that whenever a court is concerned with legislative efforts to convey trust lands to private individuals at the expense of some public use of those lands, the court will strictly scrutinize the conveyance, with a
strong presumption against the limitation or termination of public trust uses of the
land or adjacent waters. 1 ' It is not clear whether this "strong presumption" is constitutionally mandated or represents merely a congressional policy,' 16 but it is well
embedded in both federal and state law. 1 ' Regardless of the source of this pre-

Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 464. The Supreme Court decision was a four to three split. Chief Justice Fuller disqualified himself
because he had represented the railroad in the lower courts, and Justice Blatchford disqualified himself because
he held stock in the railroad. See id. at 476.
113. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 149,594 P.2d 1093, 1102 (1979) (quoting Sax, supm note 24,
at 490); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 111. 2d 65, 78-79, 360 N.E.2d 773, 780 (1976).
114. See, e.g., Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842).
115. For example, in Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 637-38, 393 N.E.2d
356, 361 (1979), a statute granting certain submerged land to a corporation in fee simple also contained language
that "nothing herein shall be understood as authorizing . . . interfere[nce] with the legal rights of any person or
persons whomsoever." This language was construed to mean that the submerged lands were conveyed subject to
the public trust. See also, e.g., CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 1988) (unless
legislative intent to give up the public interest in any tideland grant is clearly expressed or necessarily implied, the
court will interpret the statute as preserving the public interest); Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. State Mineral Bd., 199 So. 2d 554, 557-58 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
116. See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1987) (Court inferred a
congressional policy, not a constitutional obligation, to retain public trust property for future States). But see
North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & School Lands v. Andrus, 506 F.Supp. 619, 623 (D.N.D. 1981), affd on
other grounds, 671 F.2d 271 (8th Cir. 1982), revd on other grounds sub nom. Block v.North Dakota, 461 U.S.
273 (1983) (presumption arises from the constitutional doctrine of equal footing).
117. Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842) ("Grants of that description [land beneath
tidal waters] are therefore construed strictly-and it will not be presumed that [the State] intended to part from
any portion of the public domain, unless clear and especial words are used to denote it."); Greaux v. Hatchette,
164 F. Supp. 102, 105-06 (D.V.I. 1958); see also Sax, supra note 24, at 490-91 ("When a state holds a resource
which is available for the free use of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject
public uses to the self-interest of private parties."); see also People ex rel. Webb v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal.
576, 596, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913).
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sumption, courts do not look kindly upon such grants,"' and they apply a more
rigorous standard than is normally used to analyze conveyances by private parties." 9 In some cases, courts have concluded that the particular state entity or
agency that made the alleged conveyances of trust lands lacked the necessary legislative authorization. 12 Moreover, courts do not infer a conveyance of public trust
lands unless in the grant itself an "intention was definitely declared or otherwise
made very plain, or was rendered in clear and especial words."12 1
Two years after Illinois Central was decided, the Supreme Court handed down
Shively v. Bowlby,122 which held that the issue of title to submerged lands below the
high water mark was to be determined by state law. 123 Until recently, Mississippi
law has been fairly clear on this matter. 124 Mississippi public trust law prohibits
disposition or use of trust property except in furtherance of the public purpose,
and then only by approval of the legislature. 125 The Mississippi Constitution provides that "[1]ands belonging to, or under the control of the state, shall never be
donated directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals."126 This has
been held to preclude the sale of trust property at prices below the fair market
127
value.
Long-term leases at less than fair market prices are also prohibited. The state,
acting as trustee, has a duty to manage the trust so as to reasonably maximize the

118. See Sax, supra note 24, at 490; see also State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 149, 594 P.2d 1093,
1102 (1979); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 I11.2d 65, 78-79, 360 N.E.2d 773, 780(1976).
119. E.g., People ex rel. Webb v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 596, 138 P. 79, 88 (1913).
120. E.g., Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 573, 112 So. 274,286-87 (1927).
121. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 198 (1987) (quoting Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544,552 (1981)). But see infra note 133 and accompanying text (legislature's declaration of purpose is
not determinative).
122. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
123. Id. at 51-52.
124. See Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 29-15-1 to -23 (Supp. 1990) (1989 Public Trust Tidelands Legislation); see also
infra notes 152-82 and accompanying text.
125. Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 95; Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 513 (Miss. 1986). But
see MISS. CODE ANN. § 29-15-1 to -23 (Supp. 1989); Byrd v. State, supra note 74, at 7 (upholding the Mississippi
legislation; case currently under appeal). Thus, the state may not convey fee simple title to trust property unless
it is for a higher public purpose and the legislature has approved. Cinque Bambini Partnership, 491 So. 2d at 513.
Moreover, such lands are not subject to claims of adverse possession. Id. at 521; Board of Educ. v. Loague, 405
So. 2d 122, 124-25 (Miss. 1981); Gibson v. State Land Comm'r, 374 So. 2d 212, 217 (Miss. 1979); Miss.
CoNsT. art. IV, § 104; see also O'Dell & Howorth, Alabama TidelandsAfter Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi:
Time to Reinvigorate the Public Trust, 20 CUMB. L. REV. 365,387 (1990) (citing University of South Alabama v.
Alabama, No. 83-1242, slip op. at 17 (Cir. Ct. of Montgomery County, Ala. July 19, 1984)). But see Board of
Trustees v. Rye, 521 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1988) (upholding the tax sale of school trust property and holding that
even if the sale had not been effective, possession of land by plaintiffs and their predecessors for 93 years is sufficient "to raise the presumption that at some time there was a grant by the sovereign which divested itself of title
and perfected title in those from whoever the [plaintiffs] now deraign their title."). Public use can, however,
cause private lands to be claimed by the state through adverse possession. Dycus v. Sillers, 557 So. 2d 486, 501
(Miss. 1990).
126. Miss. CoNsT. art. IV, § 95. But see Rye, 521 So. 2d at 908 (upholding the tax sale of school trust property).
127. Koonce v. Board of Supervisors, 202 Miss. 473,477-78, 32 So. 2d 264, 265 (1947) (involving the sale of
school trust land); see also State ex rel. Coleman v. Dear, 212 Miss. 620, 630-32, 55 So. 2d 370, 374-75 (1951)
(sale of sixteenth section timber at below market prices); State ex rel. Kyle v. Dear, 209 Miss. 268, 278-79, 46
So. 2d 100, 104 (1950) (involving the sale of timber at below market prices).
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income from it.128 Thus, while the state can lease real estate held in trust, the state
cannot lease property at less than fair market prices.129 Although this prohibition
has not always been enforced in the past, 131 the Mississippi Supreme Court has indicated a recent willingness to enforce it. 13' Accordingly, it would be difficult for
the state to accommodate the prior title holders with a long-term low-rent lease.
Moreover, the state cannot dispose of these properties unless disposal would serve
a greater public purpose and be approved by the legislature. 32 In addition, it has
been held that a transfer is not in the public interest simply because the legislature
says it is: The "self-serving recitation of a public purpose within a legislative enactment is not conclusive of the existence of such purpose." 133 This is in keeping
with the common law rule that one who holds title as a trustee is prohibited from
giving away, appropriating to his own use, or otherwise disposing of the corpus of
a trust in derogation of the rights of the beneficiaries .134 Even if a transfer is approved by the legislature, it may later be voided. Years ago, many states sold fee
simple title to saltwater wetlands which were influenced by the tide.1 35 "This, of
course, was done primarily at a time when such wetlands were viewed as swamp,
serving no useful purpose other than to breed mosquitos and other noxious insects,"1 36 but "[t]oday, many of these transactions are being challenged as violations of the public trust doctrine."137

There is, in fact, a duty to review continually any appropriation from trust
property. NationalAudubon Society v. Superior Court38 concerned diversions of
waters from rivers feeding into Mono Lake. These waters were carried by tunnels
for use in Los Angeles. As a result of the diversions, the level of the lake dropped

128. Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 6 (Miss. 1989) (holding alease of school trust land void where the trustee
had leased it for a period of 99 years for a price of $7.50).
129. Id. See Tally v. Board of Supervisors, 323 So. 2d 547,550 (Miss. 1975) ("[Wlhere the consideration paid
for a lease is so small as to amount to a donation of the property, the lease is void.").
130. See Hill v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 12 (Miss. 1989) ("[Tlhere has been a century of disregard of this
constitutional mandate and of widespread and long continued acceptance of this practice by former officials.").
131. Id.
132. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 513 (Miss. 1986). Thus, "the State may not convey
fee simple title to properties so held in trust 'unless it is for a higher public purpose and then only by legislative
enactment.' "Id. (quoting Brief for Appellees and Cross Appellant at 8, 16).
133. People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 111.2d 347, 354, 291 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1972); see also
People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66111. 2d 65, 80, 360 N.E.2d 773, 781 (1976). But see Byrd v. State,
No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990), at 5-6 (accepting the recitation by the
Mississippi legislature).
134. See Tally v. Board of Supervisors, 323 So. 2d 547, 550 (Miss. 1975); Holmes v. Jones, 318 So. 2d 865,
868-69 (Miss. 1975). "At common law, the monarch was free to grant the soil of the tidewaters to an individual,
but could not affect the public's right to navigation." O'Dell & Howorth, supra note 125, at 385.
135. See, e.g., Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine and Ownership of Florida's Navigable Lakes, 29 U. FLA.
L. REV.730, 736-37 (1977).
136. J. KALO, supra note 24, at 87; see supra note 9 (discussing wetlands). Perhaps it was because of mosquitos
that more wetlands were not developed, but were preserved in their natural state. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip
op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990), at 3 ("Perhaps we should thank the noble mosquito for
preserving for future generations of Mississippians the balance of the trust made up of tidally-affected water bottoms.").
137. J. KALO, supra note 24, at 87.
138.33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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significantly.139 The Audubon Society sued to enjoin diversion of the waters. It
argued that the ecological balance and scenic beauty of the lake were protected by
the public trust because the lake was a navigable water.140 The California Supreme
Court agreed with the Audubon Society and concluded that the state has continuing supervisory control over navigable waters and land beneath those waters. The
public trust "prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water
in a manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust."141 Moreover,
"the state has affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning
and allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasi142
ble.,
The court further held that the state must continually review appropriations of
trust property. Not only must the initial decision to allow an appropriation be consistent with public trust objectives, but diversions and uses must be supervised to
assure that those purposes are still protected. Accordingly "[iun exercising its sovereign power to allocate water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs." 1" The earlier determination,
which had permitted the diversion, could be reviewed. Such review was particularly appropriate where the public trust doctrine had not been considered in making the initial decision. In other words, even if a conveyance is made and
approved, the title would be under a cloud since the conveyance would be subject
to later review. As the Supreme Court stated in Illinois Central, any relinquishment of trust property to private ownership "is necessarily revocable." 1

V. THE

PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS AN ENVIRONMENTALIST'S WEAPON

Recently it has been suggested that the public trust doctrine be used as a tool to
protect the environment.14 One of the earliest and most impressive cases to make
use of the public trust for environmental protection arose in Mississippi. In Parks
v. Simpson 1" an action was brought by a taxpayer against the Mississippi Marine
Conservation Commission to void a contract the commission had made authorizing dredging in public waters for the harvest of oysters.147 The plaintiffs true con-

139. Id. 33 Cal. 3d at 425-26, 658 P.2d at 711-12, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
140. Id. at 430-32, 658 P.2d at 715-16, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53.
141. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
142. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
143. Id. at 448, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
144. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453-55 (1982); see also Long Sault Dev. Co. v. Call,
242 U.S. 272,278-79 (1916); Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662,666,732 P.2d 989,992 (1987). In order to
increase alienability of land and to simplify title transactions, a few states have passed Marketable Title Acts.
These acts are designed to remove clouds by allowing minor interests to merge back into the larger interest. In
one case, it was argued that the Florida act effectively nullified the Public Trust. The Florida Supreme Court,
however, held that the act was never intended to apply to state sovereignty lands. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 492 So. 2d 339, 343-44 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).
145. See, e.g., O'Dell & Howorth, supra note 125; Sax, supra note 24, at 477.
146. 242 Miss. 894, 137 So. 2d 136(1962).
147. Parks, 242 Miss. at 897-98, 137 So. 2d at 136.
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cern, of course, was with the adverse impact that dredging would have on the
ecology of the areas in question. The court ignored concerns which had led to dismissal of a similar Texas case"' and looked instead at the commission's statutory
authority to lease tidewater bottoms. The court construed that authority narrowly
and found that oyster shells were a part of the public trust that the commission had
not been authorized to alienate.149
After the Parks v. Simpson decision, the Mississippi Legislature expressly
granted authority to the State Marine Conservation Commission to permit shell
dredging, but only under sharply limited circumstances.1 5 ' Thus, the Mississippi
Supreme Court, with help from the legislature, used the public trust doctrine to
protect an important public resource which seemed originally to have been inadequately considered by the legislature.
Many aspects of the public trust doctrine were central to the Parks v. Simpson
decision. First, was the land part of the trust? If so, was dredging for oysters a
protected use under the trust? If these matters were included in the trust, did the
agency have the right to alienate that portion of the trust? These issues provide
fertile ground for exploration. The public trust doctrine can be used as an important tool by those concerned with protecting the environment."5 '
VI.

THE Mississippi LEGISLATION

This history of the public trust doctrine clearly reveals that legislatures have often succumbed to public pressure to give up trust lands, whereas courts have jealously guarded the trust. In 1989, the Mississippi Legislature passed the Public
Trust Tidelands Legislation which fixes the trust boundaries at their 1973 location. 15 2 The primary purpose seems to have been to clear up questions as to how
the trust is affected by waters which have been filled in by land owners; however,
the legislation has created a serious question as to how rising water levels affect the
trust. The core provision reads as follows:
The Secretary of State, in cooperation with other state agencies, shall prepare a Preliminary Map of Public Trust Tidelands. The preliminary map shall depict the
boundary as the current mean high water line where shoreline is undeveloped and in
developed areas or where there have been encroachments, such maps shall depict
high water line nearest the effective date of
the boundary as the determinable mean
15
the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act. 1
After the map is completed and approved, it will be recorded. Once recorded,
"the certified map shall be final as to those properties not subject to the trust," and

148. Texas Oyster Growers Ass'n v. Odom, 385 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (dismissing the action because the suit was an impermissible imposition on state sovereignty; the authorization was within the agency's
unreviewable discretion; and the plaintiff-fishermen had no vested interest in the litigation).
149. Parks, 242 Miss. at 902-07, 137 So. 2d at 138-41.
150. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-15-1 to -109 (1972 & Supp. 1989).
151. See O'Dell & Howorth, supra note 125.

152. See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 29-15-1 to -23 (1990).
153. Id. § 29-15-7(l). The effective date of the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act was July 1, 1973.
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property owners will be issued certificates indicating that their property is not part
of the trust. 54 Although the Act purports to recognize the importance of the public
trust and to adhere to the common law doctrine, 55 it sets trust boundaries at fixed
locations.15 6 In essence, this legislation assures property owners that they will not
lose title to their property, but at the same time it puts the purposes of the trust at
risk.
The legislature has declared that this legislation is designed to promote the "certainty and stability" of land titles and, as such, is "essential to the economic welfare
of the state and to the peace, tranquility and financial security of the many thousands of citizens who own such lands." 5 It also declared resolution of boundary
uncertainty to be a "higher public purpose" 158 and preparation of accurate coastal
maps defining the public trust as being in the public interest.159 The many affirmations of the public interest seem to be directed at fending off any claim that the
state is giving away trust property in violation of its duties as trustee. However,
the "self-serving recitation of a public purpose" does not mean that a transfer is in
the public interest. 161 Instead, the court should examine the Act with a great deal
161
of judicial skepticism.
The Secretary of State has challenged the Act, claiming that it amounts to a donation in violation of the Mississippi Constitution. 162 The Secretary of State's interpretation of the Act is as follows:
Correctly interpreted this law requires the line of public trust tidelands in developed
areas to be placed at the mean high water line as of July 1, 1973, on the preliminary

154. Id. § 29-15-7(4).
155. Id. § 29-15-7(2). The common law approach is that accretions to the shores of the sea belong to the riparian or littoral owner of the land bordering the sea. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F.2d
191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952); Jackson v. United States, 56 F.2d 340, 342 (9th
Cir. 1932). Mississippi law is in accord and holds that the owner of land bounded by water is entitled to accretions thereto. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 519 (Miss. 1986); H.K. Porter Co., v.
Board of Supervisors, 324 So. 2d 746, 751 (Miss. 1975); Paepcke v. Kirkman, 55 F.2d 814, 814 (5th Cir.
1932); Anderson-Tully Co. v. Franklin, 307 F Supp. 539, 542 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
156. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(2) (1990).
157. S.2780, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1, 1989 Miss. LAws 355, 356; see also Ocean Science News, supra
note 16, at 2-3 (arguing that fixed national boundaries would serve an important purpose).
158. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-3(2) (1990).
159. Id. § 29-15-15.
160. People ex rel. City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 111. 2d 347, 354, 291 N.E.2d 807, 812 (1972); see also
People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 I11.2d 65, 80, 360 N.E.2d 773, 781 (1976).
161. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
162. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990), at 1. Section 95
of the Mississippi Constitution states as follows:
Lands belonging to, or under the control of the state, shall never be donated directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals, or to railroad companies. Nor shall such land be sold to corporations or
associations for a less price than that for which it is subject to sale to individuals. This, however, shall not
prevent the legislature from granting a right of way, not exceeding one hundred feet in width, as a mere
easement, to railroads across state land, and the legislature shall never dispose of the land covered by such
right of way so long as such easement exists.
MIsS. CoNsT. art IV, § 95.
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map, to be revised only if more accurate information with respect to the line of mean
high water at that date is received during the ensuing 60 days. 1" 3
If the Secretary's interpretation is correct, this legislation, despite affirmations
that it purports to adhere to the common law,164 violates the centuries-old doctrine
concerning trust boundaries."16
The Secretary set forth this position in Byrd v. State,166 which squarely addresses the constitutionality of the 1989 Public Trust Tidelands Legislation. The
primary concern of the chancery court in that case seems to have been the confusion, difficulty, and expense that are involved with the traditional movable boundary line for trust property. The court summarized the Act as follows:
The legislature found that certainty and stability of land titles are essential to the economic welfare of the State and to the peace, tranquility, and financial security of the
many thousands of citizens who own Coastal property . . . . [T]he legislature declared that disputes and uncertainty had developed with respect to location of the
boundary between public and private lands in tidewater areas. The legislature found
...that the dispute had caused extensive harm; that it was intolerable; and that immediate resolution was required and would serve a higher public purpose.
Furthermore, the legislature ... stated that the amount of damage, harm, or
loss that has occurred to the lands held in public trust since statehood is negligible
compared to the benefit of resolving the problem. The legislature recognized that
the cost of any other solution would far exceed the amount of public gain. 167
The chancery court accepted these matters as findings of fact,1 68 and rejected the
constitutional challenge, holding:
There was no attempt by the legislature, as the Court views it, to changethe boundary for it cannot be changed. It is the same as it was in 1817. However, a procedure
was enacted which will facilitate the location of the boundary, for it must be remembered that the 1817 boundary is elusive and there are no photographs or known
physical surveys which can precisely locate it as it actually existed in 1817.169
The court held the Act constitutional.17 0 The case is now on appea 71 and should
come before the Mississippi Supreme Court within the year.
In reaching its decision, the chancery court rejected the Mississippi Supreme
Court's boundary definition in Cinque Bambini, placing the boundary at today's

163. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch.Ct. of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990), at 11 (quoting
the Reply Brief of the Secretary of State).
164. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(2) (1990).
165. "[T]he general, possibly universal rule . .. (is] that the title of the riparian owner follows the shore line
under what has been graphically called 'a movable freehold.' " Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 219, 233 N.W.
159, 165-66 (1930) (quoting 28 HALSBURY LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (1st ed. 1914)).
166. Byrd v. State, supra note 73.
167. td. at5.
168. td.
169. td. at6.
170. td.
171. On appeal tothe Mississippi Supreme Court (No. 90TS692).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGELA WREVIEW

[Vol. 11: 1

mean high tide line.' 72 The chancery court noted that the Cinque Bambini property (about 2400 acres) had cost approximately one-and-one-half million dollars
to survey so that the boundary could be determined.173 Concluding that the expense for the entire state would be enormous,174 the chancery court stated: "Some
compromise must be effected between the purity of the Cinque Bambini boundary
definition and the needs of the people of the State of Mississippi."' 75 The chancery
court was concerned about the difficulty in determining the exact location of the
the case of
1817 boundary,' 76 but under the Supreme Court's definition, at least in
77
a rising tide, location of the 1817 boundary is essentially irrelevant. 1
If the greenhouse effect causes a general one-foot increase in water levels, the
Mississippi shoreline will move in some areas by as much as 400 feet. 78 A larger
increase in water levels will shift the shoreline even further. If these lands are held
as private property and if the boundaries of the trust are not allowed to shift with
the coast, the public may not only be denied access to these waters, it will effectively be denied the right to numerous interests, protected by the public trust: fishing, navigation and transportation, commerce, bathing, swimming and other
recreational activities, development of mineral resources, environmental protection and preservation, the enhancement of aquatic, avian, and marine life, sea agriculture and other purposes. 179 It means little to someone without a boat to have
the right to fish in gulf waters if they are denied the right to stand along the shore.
The public trust has protected such individuals in the past, but if the chancery
court's decision is allowed to stand, that right, as well as others, will be lost.
It is not surprising that the Mississippi Legislature gave in to political pressure
from coastal property owners. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court should
not allow the chancery court's decision or this legislation to stand without modification. The supreme court should view the legislature's action with great skepticism. 8 0 The public's right to use and enjoy tidally affected coastal waters should
be recognized as paramount to concerns over boundaries. "[T]he general, possibly universal rule

. .

. [is] that the title of the riparian owner follows the shoreline

172. CinqueBambini Partnership,491 So. 2d at 520; see also O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307,32223, 235 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1967). See generally Maloney & Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean
High WaterLine in CoastalBoundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REv. 185 (1974).
173. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990), at 6-7.
174. Id. That the traditional boundary measurement is expensive would not seem to impact on the constitutional question, though it might go to the question of a higher public good.
175. Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990), at 8.
176. Id. at6.
177. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. In the case of receding tide, old boundaries may be important, because the state may claim that it retains title to property which is no longer influenced by the tide. See
CinqueBambini,491 So. 2d at 513-15.
178. Titus, supranote 8, at 66.
179. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. But see Ocean Science News, supra note 16, at 2-3 (identifying advantages of fixed national boundaries).
180. This is opposed to the chancery court, which started with the assumption that any acts of the legislature
should be "clothed with apresumption of constitutionality." Byrd v. State, No. 17,879, slip op. (Ch. Ct. of Harrison County, Miss., April 18, 1990), at 2.
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under what has been graphically called 'a movable freehold.' "181 That universal
rule-which is centuries old-should be adhered to, despite any minor questions
over boundaries that it may create.182
VII.

COMPENSATION FOR ARTIFICIALLY-CREATED COASTS

Although record title owners are not normally entitled to compensation when a
gradual imperceptible increase in water levels causes their property to revert to the
public trust, efforts to protect populated areas might create a cause of action for
owners of property in other areas. If, as is likely,18 seawalls and dikes are built
around developed areas like Biloxi/Gulfport, Mobile, and New Orleans, they will
displace water. That displaced water will likely result in more land's in other areas
being subject to tidal influence. 84 Will this tidal shift be considered an avulsion or
an artificial or non-natural shift, or will this displaced water also result in more
land being added to the public trust? There is no clear agreement between the
states as to whether the public trust doctrine applies to artificially-created tideland's, shorelands, bottom lands or submerged lands, 8 ' but the general rule in
Mississippi and in a few other states is that if land was exposed to tidal or navigable
waters by artificial means, the land or waters are not subject to the public trust

181. Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 219, 233 N.W. 159, 165-66 (1930) (quoting 28 HALSBURY LAWS OF ENG361 (lst ed. 1914)).
182. Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(2) recognizes the common law approach to moving a coastal boundary, and
declares the common law approach to be the law of this state. However, such a declaration seems in direct conflict with other sections of this legislation. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(4). At the very least, this inconsistency must be resolved.
183. Titus, supra note 8, at 81-82 (a one foot rise in the water level might not justify construction of barriers,
but a two foot rise would); see id. at 85 ("[Tlhere is little doubt that such densely populated islands . . .could
justify protection for almost any conceivable rate of sea level rise."); Ocean Science News, supra note 16, at 2
(Japan has recently spent 240 million dollars protecting "two rocks 1,400 yards apart sticking no more that two
feet out of the water at high tide" because these rocks might be used to determine Japan's national boundary.).
184. Although there is a huge area for displaced water to disperse, some scientific evidence indicates that tidal
changes take place in concentrated "cells" along the coast. See Stone, HistoricShoreline Stability Duringa Period
of Relative Sea Level Rise: Northwest Florida and Southeast Alabama, Sept. 27, 1990, Biloxi, Mississippi (proceedings to be published).
185. At least one state court has come to the conclusion, that if the waters were naturally navigable, then an
artificial extension of the channel brought the extended waters within the scope of the public trust doctrine. Mentor Harbor Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193, 199, 163 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1959) ("[L]agoons, which are artificial extensions of the naturally navigable channel, became a part thereof and are public
waters.").
LAND
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doctrine."18 Thus, Mississippi public trust law indicates that these new tidelands
would not become part of the trust.
Mississippi public trust law should be modified on this point since lands on the
coast that have stayed in private ownership still share those" 'geographical, chemical and environmental' qualities that make lands beneath tidal waters unique" and
appropriate for inclusion in the trust.187 As such, it would be logical to include
these properties in the trust. However, if it can be clearly established that it is the
displacement from urban areas, and not naturally-occurring (or greenhouse-induced) tidal water that has affected the land in question, then compensation to the
record owners might be appropriate, but the trust's boundary line should be permitted to move with the shore. In such a case, it might be reasonable to tax those
areas that have benefited from the artificial constructs and use this money to pay
the people who have lost title.188
VIII.

FRE-STATEHOOD TITLE HOLDERS

LaSalle claimed Mississippi for France in 1682. After the French and Indian
War, the Treaty of Paris gave Mississippi to Britain, and it became part of British
West Florida in 1763. During the Revolutionary War, the region was occupied by
the Spanish, who ceded it to the United States in 1795 under the Treaty of San
Lorenzo. On December 10, 1817, Mississippi became a state.189 Since the
United States created the public trust doctrine and made it applicable to states as
186. Some courts, including the Mississippi Supreme Court, have held that because land was exposed to tidal
or navigable waters by artificial means, then as a necessary result the land or waters are not subject to the public
trust doctrine. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (Private lagoons which are subsequently connected to navigable waters by a government-dredged channel "fall[] within this category of interests
that the government cannot take without compensation." Unlike an "insubstantial devaluation" of private property, this situation amounts to the "imposition of [a] navigational servitude [which constitutes] . . . an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina."); Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d 508, 520
(Miss. 1986) ("[U]nder the laws of this state neither artificially created water courses, inlets, slips, marinas and
the like, nor physical improvements or alterations made thereto, become a part of the public trust, even though
they may become tidally affected."); O'Neill v. State Highway Dep't, 50 N.J. 307,235 A.2d 1, 10 (1967) ("The
State cannot acquire interior land by such artificial works as ditching which enables the tide to ebb and flow on
lands otherwise beyond it."); Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 A. D.2d 232, 236, 204 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1960) ("[T]he
basin, having been artificially created out of the private lands of [the] plaintiff. . . and having been made navigable by artificial means, would remain private property, and the waters thereof would not be subject to any public right or easement thereon."); Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 139-40, 86 S.W.2d 441, 445-46
(1935) (lands beneath public waters that are artificially flooded by a dam remain private land even though bottom
land and of natural navigable rivers are publicly owned); Haase v. Kingston Co-Operative Creamery Ass'n, 212
Wis. 585, 588-89, 250 N.W. 444,445 (1933) (where someone creates an artificial body of water upon his or her
own premises the state does not get title to the land under such water); see also Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-7(2)
(1990).
187. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469,481 (1988).
188. One problem, however, is that the greenhouse tidal shift may continue after this compensation has been
paid. Thus, it may be true that property which is covered by water in the year 2050 is covered by displaced water
and not greenhouse water, but the situation might be different in 2070. If the urban dwellers have paid compensation to a landowner whose property is now covered by water from sources other than the displaced urban water,
it would be unfair to require them to pay the next land owner, again and again, as water levels rise. Because ofthis
difficulty, it might be best simply to determine that no compensation should be paid, at least until the greenhouse
tidal shift has stabilized.
An alternative source of funding that might be used is the Public Trust Tidelands Fund, which includes rental
payments received from those who rent submerged or tidal waters. Mtss. CODE ANN. § 29-15-9 (1990).
189. FAMILY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HisToRy, supra note 35, at 730.
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they were admitted to the Union, conveyances of trust lands from any pre-statehood sovereign, including the United States, to a private title holder can bar the
application of the public trust doctrine to those lands in the grant. 190
The pre-statehood grant exception was recognized by the Mississippi Supreme
191 Although the argument failed in that case
Court in CinqueBambini Partnership.
because of factual determinations, if a pre-statehood conveyance included the
right to possession and use of the land to the exclusion of the public, the public
trust doctrine would not apply to that land. For example, the last sentence of the
1649 amendment to the Massachusetts Bay Colony Ordinance, the "Body of Liberties," reads as follows:
And for great ponds lying in common though within the bounds of some town it shall
be free for any man to fish and fowl there, and may pass and repass on foot through
any man's propriety for that end, so they trespass not on any man's corn or
meadow. 92

Thus, these "great ponds" are held in a public trust. However, those appropriated

190. Some states have been unwilling to recognize this exception to the public trust doctrine. In City of Los
Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 31 Cal. 3d 288, 644 P.2d 792, 182 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1982), rev'd sub.
noma,Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) the California Supreme
Court had to determine whether the public trust doctrine applied to tidelands that were never owned by the state
or federal government. The land in question was a lagoon which had been ceded to the United States by the Mexican government after private individuals had received title from the Mexican government. Id. at 292, 644 P. 2d at
794, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 601. The California Supreme Court concluded that the lands, when conveyed by the Mexican government, were subject to the public interest in the tidelands and that the interest was not lost by the subsequent patent of the federal government. Thus, the court concluded that the tidelands trust doctrine did apply to
the lands in question. Id. at 303-14, 644 P.2d at 801, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 608. The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed this decision, holding that "California cannot at this late date assert its public trust easement
over petitioners' property." 466 U.S. at 209. The pre-statehood conveyance exception has been recognized by
the Mississippi Supreme Court and is set forth in at least one other state's constitution. See WASH. CONST. art.
XVII, § I (limits state ownership of tidelands as against all parties declaring chain of title back prior to statehood); Stockwell v. Gibbons, 58 Wash. 2d 391, 398, 363 P.2d 111, 115 (1961) ("Under Article 17, section I of
the Washington State Constitution, all tide lands not patented to private ownership prior to statehood vested in the
State.").
191. 491 So. 2d 508, 518 (Miss. 1986).
If, at the time of acquisition by the United States in its sovereign capacity, property was already privately
owned, it follows on reason that the title was never in the United States and therefore could not have been
held by the United States in trust nor thereafter at statehood granted to the state.
Id.
192. See Slater v.Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 513, 49 N.E. 1017, 1019 (1898) (quoting THE BoDy OF LIBERTIES OF

1641 (Whitmore ed. 1660), reprinted in THE

COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS

170 (Boston 1889)). Great

ponds are defined as those covering more than ten acres, and they are declared to be public waters. See generally
Smith, The Great Pond Ordinance-Collectivismin NorthernNew England, 30 B.U.L. REv. 178 (1950); Locke,
Right of Access to Great Ponds by the Colonial Ordinance, 12 ME. L. REv. 148 (1919).
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to private owners prior to this enactment (or other similar ones) are subject to private ownership.193
That the federal government held territorial submerged lands in trust for future
states did not necessarily mean that the federal government could never validly
convey those lands to private parties prior to statehood. In managing its territories
(before they became states), the United States made many grants of land to private
owners.194 The Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby195 declared that the property
clause permitted Congress to convey territorial public trust lands and so to defeat
the title of a new state "in order to perform international obligations, or to effect
the improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience of commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States, or to carry out other public pur' "
poses appropriate to the objects for which the United States hold the Territory."19
Not all conveyances by the federal government, however, would remove the land
from the public trust.197 A grant of riparian or littoral land carried with it no implication of title to tidelands or to the beds of navigable waters."19 There is, in fact, a
"strong presumption against conveyance by the United States" of the title to the bed
of a navigable water.199
In order for a pre-statehood conveyance to defeat the public trust, two conditions must exist. First, chain-of-title must clearly be shown to extend back prior to
statehood. Second, the conveyance must convey exclusive rights of ownership and
control in clear, unequivocal words."' 0 Because the state's public trust interest is
an aspect of its sovereignty and is an interest which the Supreme Court has indicated is of "substantial magnitude,"2 1 the grant or conveyance will be interpreted

193. See Lynnfield v. Peabody, 219 Mass. 322, 328, 106 N.E. 977, 980 (1914) (quoting Commonwealth v.
City of Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 528 (1858)) (prior to the 1647 ordinance, "Great ponds were not at first
reserved as public property or lying in common." Peabody, 219 Mass. at 328, 106 N.E. at 980. Therefore, "[o]rdinarily a grant of a pond as a piece of real estate would include the entire area within its borders." Peabody, 219
Mass. at 328, 106 N.E. at 979 (quoting Attorney General v. Herrick, 190 Mass. 307, 313, 76 N.E. 1045, 1048
(1906))); see also Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River, 154 Mass. 305,307, 28 N.E. 257, 257-58 (1891) (Great
ponds legislation not applicable to grants prior to 1647); Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7
Allen) 158, 171 (1863) (Great ponds appropriated to private persons prior to 1647 do not "lie in common for
public use.").
194. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (discussing ownership of accretion to property conveyed
by the United States prior to statehood).
195. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
196. Id. at 48; see also Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. Land's Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 204-09 (1984) (carrying out treaty provisions represents an "international duty"); United States v. City of Anchorage, 437 F.2d
1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1971) (grant of public trust lands to federally owned and operated railroad deemed a public
purpose); United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d. 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 967 (1970) ("public purpose" served by grant to game refuge).
197. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
198. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,48, 51, 58 (1894); Railroad Co. v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 272,
287 (1869); United States v. Pacheco, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 587, 590 (1865); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 229 (1845). See generally Bade, Title, Pointsand Lines in Lakes and Streams, 24 MINN. L. REV. 305, 31011 (1940) (conveyances by the United States, within its territories, are measured under federal law).
199. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981).
200. See United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); State Dep't of Natural Resources v. Haines,
627 P.2d 1047, 1052 (Alaska 1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 589 (La. 1974); Klais
v. Danowski, 373 Mich. 262, 275, 129 N.W.2d 414,420-21 (1964).
201. Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. Land's Comm'n, 466 U.S. 198, 209 (1984).
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against the grantee. The dual burdens of proving pre-statehood title and of the
conveyance's being interpreted against the grantee pose difficult obstacles to a private landholder's making this argument. In fact, the Supreme Court has never determined that the United States actually granted sovereign lands to private parties
prior to statehood.202
IX. CONCLUSION

If the greenhouse effect does cause temperatures to increase and water levels to
rise, the geographical effects will be dramatic, but some practices might help to
reduce their impact. For instance, if wetlands are allowed to migrate inward
rather than face destruction, the impact on fish and animal life might be lessened. 20 3 From a more preventative standpoint, any reduction in the production of
trace gases will certainly be advantageous. More fuel-efficient cars would at least
help slow the rate of global warming and perhaps reduce its effect.24 As sad as it
is, one realistic answer might be that people can try to adapt to the new world they
have created.
Careful land use planning now can help reduce expenses in the future for remedies of last resort-ports, levees, and seawalls.25 Engineers should incorporate

the likelihood of sea-level rises into their current plans and decisions, but engineers should not try to construct buildings strong enough to stand up to the new
water levels. Instead, buildings should be set well back from today's waterline. In
order to save important ecosystems, like wetlands and beachfront estuaries, they
must be allowed to migrate landward . 20 6 Strong buildings will only destroy the
beaches and hinder the migration of dunes and wetlands .2 7 Decision-makers
should not allow developers to build in areas that will be subject to flooding, and
insurance companies (especially the federal government's National Flood Insurance Program) should carefully review the geography of an area before writing
coverage.2 ° 8 Creative legislation can help achieve some of these goals. 2

The 1989 Public Trust Tidelands Legislation should be clarified. Navigable
and coastal waters have long held positions of extreme importance to the public in
general. Although individuals may lose property because of a greenhouse induced
202. J. KALO, supra note 24, at 80. But see, Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970) (United States
grant to Indian Nations upheld due to the particular Indian treaties involved). Arguably, however, the Indian
tribes represented a sovereign nation, not individuals. Id. at 653 (White, J., dissenting).
203. Titus, supra note 8, at 66.
204. Mardon, The Lean, Clean Car Campaign, SIERlA, July-Aug. 1990, at 21.
205. See Solomon & Freedberg, supra note 6, at 105.
206. Titus, supra note 8, at 73.
207. Id. at 71. Seawalls and dikes will also be built at the cost of ecologically valuable wetlands. Miller, supra
note 1, at 190.
208. Titus, supra note 8, at 87. This may be the most efficient way to control beachfront development. The
landowner who wanted to put his investment at risk could do so, but much construction would be stopped without
the government's imposing a "taking." Id. at 71, 86.
209. See Solomon & Freedberg, supra note 6, at 105 n. 121 (discussing Maine's regulations requiring the removal of man-made obstructions as the water rises and wetlands migrate inward); Titus, supra note 8, at 70-71
(discussing a similar rule in Texas which requires that tidal changes be considered before new construction is begun); Miller, supra note 1, at 228-29 (discussing legislation to reduce trace gas emissions).
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tidal change, the superior right of the public should not be defeated. Those who
now own property that may become subject to tidal influences have sufficient time
to prepare. They should recognize that their property may gradually, imperceptibly, be encroached upon by water. They should also realize that this may cause
them to lose title to their property; however, this does not mean that they need to
sell their property tomorrow since their land will remain usable and enjoyable for
decades to come, even though it might one day begin to decrease in value. This is
true of any real estate and is but one factor which should be weighed in the calculation of whether to build on, buy, or sell coastal property. If concessions must be
provided to current property owners, they should be granted at most monetary
compensation or the limitedjus privatum interest. The state should retain the jus
publicum interest. In no way should the state allow private interests to interfere
with the public's right to use and enjoy navigable and coastal waters.
After clarifying the 1989 Public Trust Tidelands Legislation, the Mississippi
Legislature could enact legislation similar to that in Maine, which requires the removal of man-made obstructions as the water rises and wetlands migrate inward.2 1 Additionally, the state could benefit from legislation requiring tidal
changes to be considered before any new construction is begun in coastal areas.21
Furthermore, even though Mississippi, as compared to other states, has few problems in terms of air pollution, a focus on reducing the production of trace gases
would certainly be beneficial.2 12 Any of these enactments would be far more advantageous than the 1989 Public Trust Tidelands Legislation.
The public trust doctrine should be of utmost concern to all who have an interest
in Mississippi coastal property. If the greenhouse effect does actually lead to dramatic shifts in water levels, the public trust doctrine will emerge as a critical legal
issue for the next century. Steps may be taken today to help minimize adverse
greenhouse effects and to prepare for the new waterlines, but the state should not
let property ownership concerns infringe on the public's right to use these properties. The public trust has protected the public's right to use and enjoy the world's
waters and coastlines for centuries. It should remain a vital and useful means of
protecting such rights as we enter into the next century.

210. See Solomon & Freedberg, supra note 6, at 105 n.121 (discussing Maine's regulations).
211. Titus, supra note 8, at 70-71 (discussing a similar rule in Texas which requires that tidal changes be considered before new construction is begun).
212. Miller, supra note 1, at 228-29 (discussing legislation to reduce trace gas emissions). See, e.g., OR. REV.
STAT. § 469.060(3)(e) (1989) (setting a goal of reducing emissions by 20% by the year 2005).

